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I. INTRODUCTION

Cas-trate:
"1 a : to deprive of the testes... b : to deprive of the ovaries... 2:
to deprive of vigor of vitality"'

* I would like to thank my family and friends for their continuing support and
encouragement, especially Jon Newlon for his advice and suggestions regarding this Note.
1. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICrIONARY 349 (G. & C. Merriam
Company, 1993).
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In May of 1997, Florida joined the ranks of only a few states that
mandate the new rage in criminal punishment: chemical castration.' The
new Florida castration law requires judges to sentence sexual offenders
to chemical alteration of their bodies after committing their second
offense, while leaving it within judges' discretion to impose the same
sentence for the first offense
Serious constitutional problems accompany the new law. Because of
their recency, none of the pre-existing chemical castration laws in other
states have been tested in court. Potential implications under the Federal
Constitution include violations of the First Amendment' the Equal
Protection5 and the Due Process 6 Clauses of the Fourteenth Amend-

2. See 1997 Fla. Laws ch. 97-184. Other states that allow chemical castration include
California, CAL. PENAL CODE § 645 (West 1997), Louisiana, LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 538 (West

1997), Mississippi, 1997 Miss. LAWS § 41-45-1, and Montana, 1997 MONT. LAWS ch. 334
(1997). Idaho, Alabama, Kansas, Pennsylvania, Colorado, and Utah are all considering
implementing chemical castration laws. See Margaret Talev, Reaction Mixed on Chemical
Castration,TAMPA TRiB., June 1, 1997, at BI.
3. See 1997 Fla. Laws ch. 97-184(a)-(b).
4. Although it may sound unusual, an argument may be made that the forced
administration of a drug that affects the brain is a violation of the First Amendment because it
deprives sexual offenders of their dreams, fantasies, or thoughts. See G.L. Stelzer, Note,
Chemical Castration and the Right to Generate Ideas: Does the FirstAmendment Protect the
Fantasies of Convicted Pedophiles?, 81 MiNN. L. REv. 1675, 1686-90 (1997). Although the
Supreme Court has never found a First Amendment right to generate ideas, see id. at 1690, the
argument is made that the generation of ideas is a necessary antecedent to the expression of
ideas. See id. at 1689. The right could be justified on the grounds that it is immoral for the
government to "substantially alter a person's mentation against his will." See id. While current
First Amendment analysis may be unsuitable for analysis of a right to generate ideas, it could
be modified to encompass mental rights. See id. For a full discussion of the First Amendment
as it applies to chemical castration, see id. at 1686-90.
5. For detailed discussions of the implications to Equal Protection, see Daniel L.
Icenogle, Sentencing Male Sex Offenders to the Use of Biological Treatments: A Constitutional
Analysis, 15 J. LEG. MED. 279, 300-02 (1994) (concluding that California's chemical castration
law is valid under a Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection analysis); Recent Legislation:
Constitutional Law-Due Process and Equal Protection--California Becomes the First State to
Require Chemical Castration of Certain Sex Offenders-Act of Sept. 17, 1996; ch. 596, 1996
Cal. Stat. 92 (to be codified at CAL. PENAL CODE § 645), 110 HARV. L. REV. 799, 801-04
(1997) (arguing that California's chemical castration law violates the Equal Protection Clause).
6. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides, "[n]o State shall...
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend.
XIV, § 1. The Florida Castration Law applies to both men and women. See 1997 Fla. Laws ch.
97-184. However, the castration drug is a contraceptive drug when used on women. See Recent
Legislation, supra note 5, at 8701 (discussing generally the California law's possible violation
of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment). This implicates procreation rights,
and although the government may have a compelling interest in protecting society from the
recidivism of sex offenders, the sterilization of women is completely unrelated to the avoidance
of sexual battery. See id. at 801-02.
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ment, and the cruel and unusual punishment provision of the Eighth
Amendment This Note discusses the constitutionality of the new
Florida castration law, with a special focus on analysis under Article I,
Section 23 of the Florida Constitution. Section Two of this Note gives
brief backgrounds of both the Florida castration law and the drug
administered under that law. Section Three discusses the history of
litigation involving chemical castration. Section Four briefly outlines the
right to privacy under the Federal Constitution, then provides a detailed
analysis of the Florida castration law, discussing how the new law
implicates the privacy provision of the Florida Constitution and arguing
that the new law is unconstitutional because it does not survive strict
scrutiny review. The Note concludes by suggesting changes to the
Florida castration law which are necessary for the law to pass constitutional muster.
II.BACKGROUND

A. The Law
The Florida castration law is essentially identical to recent legislation
passed in California.' Both laws give a judge discretion to sentence a

7. While there are many interpretations as to what constitutes cruel and unusual
punishment, there is a strong argument that the Florida castration law violates the aspirational
principles of the Eighth Amendment. See Raymond A. Lombardo, Note, California's
UnconstitutionalPunishmentfor Heinous Crimes: Chemical Castrationof Sexual Offenders, 65

FORDHAM L. REV. 2611, 2621, 2625-26 (1997) (describing the aspirational approach to Eighth
Amendment analysis). When given an evolutionary reading, the Eighth Amendment allows
modem notions of cruel and unusual punishment to be evaluated. Factors such as the gratuitous
infliction of suffering and the denial of human dignity could indicate that a law violates of the
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. See id. at 2633-35. For a detailed discussion
of the Eighth Amendment as it applies to chemical castration, see id. at 2611-46.
8. Compare CAL. PENAL CODE § 645 (West 1997) with 1997 Fla. Laws ch. 97-184. The
California law states, in part:
§ 645. Sex offenses; parole; medroxyprogesterone acetate treatment or equivalent;
protocols
(a) Any person guilty of a first conviction of any offense specified in
subdivision (c), where the victim has not attained 13 years of age, may, upon
parole, undergo medroxyprogesterone acetate treatment or its chemical equivalent,
in addition to any other punishment prescribed for that offense or any other
provision of law, at the discretion of the court.
(b) Any person guilty of a second conviction of any offense specified in
subdivision (c), where the victim has not attained 13 years of age, shall, upon
parole, undergo medroxyprogesterone acetate treatment or its chemical equivalent,
in addition to any other punishment prescribed for that offense or any other
provision of law.
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first time sex offender to chemical castration, and both mandate a judge
to impose such a sentence upon a repeat offender.9 However, the
Florida Castration Law, unlike that of California, does not limit this new
punishment to child molesters." All defendants guilty of "sexual
battery" are candidates for castration in Florida."
The term "sexual battery" is defined in Florida Statutes, section
794.011(h) to include circumstances involving "oral, anal, or vaginal
penetration by, or union with, the sexual organ of another or the anal or
vaginal penetration of another by any other object."'" The law is
gender-neutral, so both male and female offenders will be subjected to
treatment.13 The treatment provided for in the statute consists of
injecting the offender with medroxyprogesterone acetate (MPA), which
is to be administered in addition to, not in lieu of, any sentence imposed
through the sexual battery statutes. 4 The administration of the drug
begins just before the defendant is released from incarceration, and can
continue for life.' The law does provide, however, that the defendant
can opt out of "treatment" by submitting to actual physical castration. 6
The administration of the drug is also contingent upon a court-appointed
CAL.

PENAL CODE

§ 645 (West 1997).

The Florida castration law states, in part:
(1) Notwithstanding any other law, the court:
(a) May sentence a defendant to be treated with medroxyprogesterone acetate
(MPA), according to a schedule of administration monitored by the Department of
Corrections, if the defendant is convicted of sexual battery as described in s.
794.011, Florida Statutes.
(b) Shall sentence a defendant to be treated with medroxyprogesterone acetate
(MPA), according to a schedule of administration monitored by the Department of
Corrections, if the defendant is convicted of sexual battery as described in s.
794.011, Florida Statutes, and the defendant has a prior conviction of sexual battery
under s. 794.011, Florida Statutes.
1997 Fla. Laws ch. 97-184.
9. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 645(a)-(b); 1997 Fla. Laws ch. 97-184(l)(a)-(b).
10. See id.
11. See 1997 Fla. Laws ch. 97-184.
12. FLA. STAT. § 794.011(h) (1997). The statute goes on to identify when the act shall be
a crime, with provisions addressing ages of victims and offenders, various degrees of force, and
lack of consent. See id. § 794.011.
13. See id. § 794.011.
14. 1997 Fla. Laws ch. 97-184(1)(b).
15. See 1997 Fla. Laws ch. 97-184(2).
16. See 1997 Fla. Laws ch. 97-184(1)CO). Interestingly, the Florida castration law is written
to be gender-neutral, but provides for a physical castration option. Id. It is not clear whether and
how this would be carried out on female defendants.
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medical officer's determination
that the defendant is an "appropriate
17
candidate for treatment.
B. The Drug
MPA theoretically has the effect of reducing the male sex drive, and
consequently, reducing the possibility of an offender committing another
sexual battery after his or her release from prison." MPA's effectiveness to that end, however, is questionable. 9
MPA, also known by the brand name "Depo-Provera," is a synthetic
female hormone used widely as a birth control drug for women."
Studies have shown that, when used on men, MPA reduces testosterone
levels and is somewhat effective in the treatment of certain types of
sexual deviance disorders.2 ' However, the mechanism by which the
drug lowers sex drive is unclear.' While the reduction in testosterone
levels is clear, the effectiveness in treating sexual deviance disorders
may instead be attributable to a tranquilizing effect on the brain.'
MPA is injected intravenously, on a weekly basis.24 Each dose costs
approximately $40, making a year's dosage cost about $2000.'
Possible side effects include weight gain, lethargy, hot flashes, nightmares, hypertension, elevated blood sugar, shortness of breath, testicle
shrinkage and reduced sperm count and motility.26 It may also cause
cancer in laboratory animals.27 In fact, studies suggest that MPA's
"non-contraceptive use in high doses produces atypical sperm and is
associated with congenital abnormalities.... [L]ong-term use to treat
paraphilias may lead to deformed children.... 28

17. See 1997 Fla. Laws ch. 97-184(2)(a).
18. See Icenogle, supra note 5, at 284. The sentence is to be imposed on top of any prison

sentence served by the offender. See 1997 Fla. Laws ch. 97-184(l)(b).
19. See infra note 50 and accompanying text.
20. Depo-Provera was approved for use in birth control in 1992. PHYSICIAN'S DESK
REFERENCE 2079-81 (51st ed. 1997).
21. See Icenogle, supra note 5, at 284 (describing the use of MPA in treatment of sexual
offenders and detailing results from various studies).
22. See id.
23. See id.
24. See id.; Talev, supra note 2, at B1. MPA is administered intravenously rather than
orally to ensure consumption of the drug. See Icenogle, supra note 5, at 284.
25. See Talev, supra note 2, at B 1.
26. See Icenogle, supra note 5, at 285; Lombardo, supra note 7, at 2614.
27. See Lombardo, supra note 7, at 2614.
28. William Green, Depo-Provera, Castration, and the Probation of Rape Offenders:
Statutory and Constitutional Issues, 12 U. DAYTON L. REV. 1, 6 n.31 (1986) (citing
CONNECTICUT DEP'T OF CORREMCONS, REPORT OF THE DEPO-PROVERA STUDY GROUP 5

(1983)).
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The drug's effectiveness has been studied in relation to a specific
class of sex offenders. Paraphilias, who are characterized by hormonal
obsessions with sexual acts manifested in particularized sexual fantasies,29 have been the subjects of experiments that have shown some
promise for the drug's efficacy. Sex crimes, however, may have
various possible motivations with paraphilia being only one of them.3
In addition, although paraphilia may be one motivation of the sex
offender, its diagnosis is difficult.32
Paraphilia is characterized by a variety of behavioral manifestations,
and its diagnosis calls for in-depth analysis of behavior and the
motivations underlying that behavior.33 The difficulty is that other
motivations for sex crimes, such as retardation or otherwise decreased
intellect, psychosis,34 and violence35 may be characterized by the same
behavioral manifestations as paraphilia.36 A sex offender manifesting
these behaviors therefore may be misdiagnosed as suffering from
paraphilia when the offender's true motivation lies elsewhere.37 This is
significant in that MPA has been found effective only in treating
paraphilia. s
Further, the successes achieved in treating paraphilia with MPA have
occurred in situations where the sexual offender has voluntarily
consented to the treatment and has expressed a desire to be rehabilitat-

29. See Lombardo, supra note 7, at 2614 n.17. Paraphilia is defined as "recurrent, intense
sexually arousing fantasies, sexual urges, or behaviors generally involving 1) nonhuman objects,
2) the suffering or humiliation of oneself or one's partner, or 3) children or other nonconsenting
persons, that occur over a period of at least 6 months." Id. (quoting AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC
ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 522-23 (4th ed.
rev. 1994)).
30. See id. at 2614.
31. See Icenogle, supra note 5, at 281-82.
32. See id. at 281.
33. See id.
34. Id. at 281-82.
35. See, e.g., Donald J. West, Sex Offenses and Offending, in 5 CRIME AND JUSTICE: AN
ANNUAL REVIEW OF RESEARCH

183, 200 (Michael Tonry & Norval Morris eds., 1983). "In their

sexual assaults these men avenge themselves on innocent strangers for real or imagined
rejections, treachery, or insults to their masculine pride experienced at the hands of women they
have known." Id. at 201. West also described Peter Sutcliffe, the "so-called Yorkshire Ripper,
who... was in the habit of waylaying women he believed to be prostitutes, not to take
advantage of their services, but in order to stab or bludgeon them to death" apparently motivated
by a hatred of sexuality. Id. at 201-02. This motivation for sexual battery is comparable to recent
"gay bashing" reports in the United States. See id. at 202.
36. See Icenogle, supra note 5, at 281-82.
37. See id.
38. See id. at 281.
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ed.39 When the drug is administered in such a situation, the offender
experiences a higher threshold for sexual arousal and therefore is better
able to comprehend and utilize psychological counseling.' His' mind
is somewhat cleared of otherwise constant sexual thoughts, and he is
" 'metaphorically on vacation from the demands of his sex drive and is
[thus], able to experience an erotic or psycho-sexual realignment in
conjunction with counseling.' 42 MPA injections accompanied by
psychological counseling have been shown effective in treating
paraphilias.43 However, as previously mentioned, the sex offender must
first have a desire to undergo treatment and counseling.'
Commentators actually have questioned the validity of tests establishing MPA's effectiveness in treating sex offenders. 5 For example, U.C.
Berkeley Law Professor Franklin E. Zimring has refuted California
Governor Pete Wilson's assertion that sex offenders have a 75%
recidivism rate. 6 Zimring discovered that the California Department of
Corrections' own statistics indicate that the governor's figures are
reversed: that 75% of child molesters are not returned to prison after
two years of release, that less than two thirds of all sex offenders were
returned to prison for any reason after two years, and that the only

Antiandrogenic
39. See Lombardo, supra note 7 (discussing Paul A. Walker et al.,
Treatment of the Paraphilias,in GUIDELINES FOR THE USE OF PSYCHOTROPIC DRUGS 427, 433
(Harvey C. Stancer et al. eds., 1984)).
40. See id.
41. The studies tested the effectiveness of MPA on male subjects only. See Icenogle, supra
note 5, at 284.
42. See Green, supra note 28, at 5-6 (quoting John Money et al., Combined
Antiandrogenic and Counseling Programfor the Treatment of 46XY and 47XYY Sex Offenders,
in HORMONES, BEHAVIOR, AND PSYCHOTHERAPY 119 (E. Sachar ed., 1976)).
43. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
44. See supra note 39 and accompanying text." 'If somebody wants to fulfill their sexual
fantasies they will do so whether they are on the drug or not... If you want to go out and hurt
people, [the drug] isn't strong enough to overrule those urges.' " Rhonda L. Rundle, Will
'Chemical Castration'Really Work?, WALL ST. J., Sept. 19, 1996, at BI (quoting an anonymous
sex offender who has taken Provera orally for eight years). Fred S. Berlin, the founder of John
Hopkins University's clinic for sexual disorders and a supporter of Depo-Provera's use in certain
situations, explains that "[y]ou can only help people to help themselves." Id. Further, "[a]
chemical alone can't fix ills that are deeply rooted in the mind... and doctors shouldn't tinker
with a person's sexuality against his will." Talev, supra note 2, at B2 (quoting Fred S. Berlin);
see also Opinion, CastrationLaw Misses the Point, WIS. ST. J., Sept. 13, 1996, available in
1996 WL 12082003 (commenting that patients can nullify the effects of Depo-Provera by taking
steroids).
45. See infra notes 46-50 and accompanying text.
46. See Franklin E. Zimring, The Truth About Repeat Sex Offenders, L.A. TIMES, May 5,
1997, at B5.
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criminal groups with comparably low recidivism rates were drunk
drivers and vehicular homicide offenders.47
Other critics attack the presumption made in MPA studies that the
underlying motivation for sex crimes is hormonal impulse, instead
asserting that rape is a crime of violence motivated by other factors.48
Still others attack the statistical validity of reports detailing the
effectiveness of MPA, claiming that the results were obtained through
single experimental designs rather than control group studies.49 In fact,
one source has asserted that "[t]here is currently no good scientific
evidence
that [MPA] is effective for the treatment of male sex offend50
ers.
III. HISTORY: LITIGATION INVOLVING
CHEMICAL CASTRATION

Castration is not a new method of punishment. In the contemporary
western world, Denmark, Germany, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland
all allow the physical castration of rapists." Physical castration has
been considered violative of the United States Constitution since 1897,

47. See id.; see also Fred S. Berlin & H. Martin Malin, Media Distortion of the Public's
Perceptionof Recidivism and PsychiatricRehabilitation, 148 AM. J.PSYCHIATRY 1572 (1991)

(explaining some causes of the misperception the public has about recidivism rates).
48. See Lombardo, supra note 7, at 2614-15. "Dr. Domeena Renshaw, a psychiatrist at the
Loyola University sexual dysfunction clinic, says that, as a deterrent for rape, 'surgical
castration' is 'medically useless.' They rape with their head. They can use a Coke bottle or a
knife and they'll still rape." Pamela K. Hicks, CastrationofSexual Offenders: Legal and Ethical

Issues, 14 J. LEG. MED. 641, 665 (1993). If surgical castration is "useless" to deter rape, then
chemical castration is likely to be just as useless.
49. See Lombardo, supra note 7, at 2615; see also Green, supra note 28, at 7.
50. Green, supra note 28, at 7 n.35. The use of MPA has been criticized because there are
no controlled studies with long-term follow-up.... There have been no doubleblind studies which compare the effectiveness of Depo-Provera plus counseling or
psychotherapy to psychotherapy or counseling and a saline injection.., and no
studies which compare the effect of Depo-Provera and counseling to Depo-Provera
alone, without the concomitant use of therapy. [Since... miost of the papers
reporting use of Depo-Provera for this purpose use the drug in conjunction with
psychotherapy or counseling[,.... it is impossible to know ...whether the
counseling alone would have been an equally effective method for treatment.
Without such information, a conclusion that Depo-Provera is effective for this use
would be completely conjectural.
Id. (quoting letter from Sidney Wolfe and Cary LaCheu, of Public Citizens Health Research
Groups, to Robert J. Brooks, Chairman of the Conn. Depo-Provera Task Force Comm. Dep't
of Corrections (Oct. 17, 1983)) (alterations in original).
51. Green, supra note 28, at 3.
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when the Supreme Court of Georgia stated that the prohibition against
cruel and unusual punishment was "intended to prohibit the barbarit[y]
of... castration."52 However, due to recent medical advances, chemical castration has only begun to be assimilated into legislation as
mandatory punishment in the past few months.53 Consequently, there
are few judicial opinions which address this form of punishment.'
Cases that have dealt with the subject have done so either indirectly or
in a manner which avoided the constitutional questions. Despite its
presence in litigation as early as the 1980s, no court has addressed the
constitutional issues raised by the use of MPA in criminal punishment.
For example, in People v. Gauntlett,55 a 1984 Michigan case, the
defendant was convicted of criminal sexual conduct in the first degree
for having intercourse with his 14-year-old stepdaughter. 6 After a nolo
contendere plea, the defendant was sentenced to five years of probation,
with the first year in jail, and submission to injection with Depo-Provera
for the full five years of the sentence.57 Although the defendant raised
constitutional objections on appeal, the court did not reach any of these
issues as it found the sentence violative of state law.58 Rather, the court
discussed the use of Depo-Provera in criminal sentencing, and recognized the criticisms offered against its use.59

52. Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 404 (1910) (quoting Whitten v. State, 47 Ga.
297 (1897)) (interpreting a clause in the Georgia Constitution which was identical to the Eighth
Amendment). However, in an infamous opinion written by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, the
United States Supreme Court upheld a state law providing for the sterilization of the mentally
infirm, stating that "[t]hree generations of imbeciles are enough." See Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S.
200, 207 (1927). In 1942, the Supreme Court declared an Oklahoma law that provided for the
sterilization of "habitual criminals" to be violative of the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. See Skinner v. State of Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
53. See Winfield v. Division of Pan-Mutual Wagering, 477 So. 2d 544, 547 (Fla. 1985).
54. See id.
55. 352 N.W.2d 310 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984).
56. See id. at 311. Ironically, Mr. T.I. Gauntlett, one of the first defendants ever to be
sentenced to injection with Depo-Provera for a sex offense, was the great-grandson of the
founder of the Upjohn Company, which developed the drug. See Rundle, supra note 44, at B1.
57. See Gauntlett,352 N.W.2d at 313.
58. See id. at 314, 317.
59. See id. at 315-17. The Gauntlett court recognized the important elements of consent
and counseling by stating that, "even in the few studies undertaken to treat sex offenders with
[MPA], participation was voluntary. In those cases, the chemical treatment was accompanied by
psychotherapy." IcL at 315. The court also recognized criticisms of Dr. Fred Berlin's study on
MPA use by stating that, "of the 20 patients included in the study, nine dropped out of treatment
within one year and two others relapsed less than one year after treatment." kaL Furthermore, the
court recognized that a Connecticut Department of Corrections study resulted in that state's
rejection of MPA as a viable treatment for sex offenders because of concerns that the drug was
dangerous. See id.
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IV. PRIVACY AS A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT

A. Privacy Under the U.S. Constitution
Since the 1965 case of Griswold v. Connecticut, the United States
Supreme Court has recognized an individual's right to privacy.' The
Griswold1 Court found that, although the Constitution does not contain
an explicit reference to a right to privacy, that right nevertheless exists
in specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights which have "penumbras,62
formed by emanations from those guarantees that help give them life
and substance."63 These penumbras establish zones of privacy comprised of various "fundamental constitutional guarantees."6 " On the
federal level, those zones of privacy have been found to encompass
marital relations, 65 procreation,' child rearing,' contraception,'
possession of obscene material in the home,69 and the right to bodily
integrity." In addition, some federal courts have included the right to

60. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
61. Id.

62. Penumbra is defined as:
1 : a shadow cast (as in an eclipse) where the light is partly but not wholly cut
off by the intervening body : a space of partial illumination between the
perfect shadow on all sides and the full light... 3 a : a surrounding or
adjoining region in which something exists in a lesser degree : a marginal area
: FRINGE.
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICInoNARY 1673 (G. & C. Merriam Company, 1993).

63. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484.
64. See id. at 484-85.
65. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967). Although Loving does not refer
specifically to marriage as a fundamental privacy right, it recognizes marriage as "one of the
vital personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness." Id. Loving has routinely been
cited in support of marriage as a fundamental privacy right. See, e.g., Rogers v. Okin, 478 F.
Supp. 1342, 1365 (D. Mass. 1979).
66. See, e.g., Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (Okla. 1942) (stating that the right
to procreate is "one of the basic civil rights of man"); see also Green, supra note 28, at 24 n.156
(describing Skinner as an "equal protection case, but the Supreme Court emphasized... that
it was dealing with procreation, a fundamental right").
67. See, e.g., Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925). As was the case
in Loving, see supra note 65, "privacy" was not a specific issue in Pierce, though Pierce has
since been cited in support of child rearing as a privacy right. See, e.g., Rogers, 478 F. Supp.
at 1365.
68. See supra text accompanying notes 60-64; see also Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438,
453 (1972) (holding that the decision to use contraceptives is one of individual privacy so that
the state could not prohibit non-married persons from exercising that choice).
69. See, e.g., Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565 (1969).
70. See, e.g., Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 772 (1966).
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refuse medical treatment within the penumbral rights of the First, Third,
Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Amendments." The United States Supreme
Court, however, has not recognized the right to refuse medical treatment
as a "generalized constitutional right of privacy," but rather considers
the issue "more properly analyzed in terms of a Fourteenth Amendment
liberty interest." 72
B. Privacy Under the FloridaConstitution
Floridians do not have to rely on penumbras, emanations, or zones
of privacy to be secured in their persons. In 1980, the citizens of Florida
voted to include a guarantee of privacy in their state constitution.73
Article I, section 23 of the Florida Constitution currently states that
"[e]very natural person has the right to be let alone and free from
governmental intrusion into his private life." 74
Florida courts have had many opportunities to interpret the express
right of privacy under the Florida Constitution. In Rasmussen v. South
Florida Blood Service,75 the Supreme Court of Florida stated that
Florida has "a strong, freestanding right of privacy as a separate section
of its state constitution, thus providing an explicit textual foundation for
those privacy interests inherent in the concept of liberty which may not
otherwise be protected by specific constitutional provisions."76 More
recently, a Florida appellate court has held that "Article 1, section 23 of
the Florida Constitution specifically provides a constitutional right of
privacy broader in scope than the protection provided in the United
States Constitution."

71. See, e.g., Rennie v. Klein, 653 F.2d 836, 842-44 (3d Cir. 1981); Rogers, 478 F. Supp.

at 1366.
72. See Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 279 n.7 (1990).
73. See FLA. CONST. art. I, § 23. Article 1, Section 23 was adopted on November 4, 1980,
by public referendum. The final vote was approximately 61% for and 39% against passage. See
Scott Denson, Comment, Florida'sConstitutionalShield. An Express Right to be Let Alone by
Government and the Private Sector, 20 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 907, 909 n.24 (1993) (citation
omitted) (citing to Gerald B. Cope, Jr., A Quick Look at Florida'sNew Right of Privacy, FLA.
B.J., Jan. 1981, at 12, 14 n.3)
74. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 23. The Florida Constitution is currently being revised by the

Constitutional Revision Committee. It is unclear how this revision will affect the right to privacy
in Florida. For the most current information regarding the revision and proposals that could alter
the right to privacy, see the Committee's web site at http:llwww.law.fsu.edulcrclproposalsl
index.html.

75. 500 So. 2d 533 (Fla. 1987).
76. Id. at 536 (citation omitted).
77. Berkely v. Eisen, 699 So. 2d 789, 790 (4th DCA 1997).
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1. Legitimate Expectations
The Supreme Court of Florida has held that Florida's right of privacy
is an explicit right which provides greater protection than the Federal
Constitution. 8 That right attaches when an individual has a legitimate
expectation of privacy.7 9 In determining the legitimacy of an
individual's expectation of privacy, the analysis begins with the
subjective expectations of the individual. 0 If these are not "spurious or
false"81 as compared to objective expectations of society, the expectation is legitimate.82
It is reasonable to assume that a convicted sex offender has a
subjective expectation of maintaining the privacy interest of bodily
integrity in the context of refusing unwanted medical treatment. Whether
or not a convicted sex offender has this subjective expectation of
privacy is irrelevant, however, if society is not prepared to recognize the
expectation. In the context of a prison environment, the Supreme
Court of Florida has recognized that "society would insist that the
prisoner's expectation of privacy always yield to what must be
considered the paramount interest in institutional security." 4 In
addition, the United States Supreme Court has established that lawful
incarceration denies many privileges and rights, and this denial is
justified by the underlying needs of the penal system. 5 Therefore,
Florida may deny certain basic rights to an individual convicted of a
felony.86 However, this governmental right to deny some individual
rights does not include the right to deny a prisoner of all constitutionally
protected rights. 7
In Metropolitan Dade County v. P.L. Dodge Foundations,s" Florida's
Third District Court of Appeal held that "[a] prisoner, like any other
citizen, may not forcibly be given medical treatment without his express

78. See North Miami v. Kurtz, 653 So. 2d 1025, 1027 (Fla. 1995).
79. See, e.g., Stall v. State, 570 So. 2d 257, 260 (Fla. 1990), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1250
(1991); Winfield, 477 So. 2d at 546.
80. See, e.g., State v. Conforti, 688 So. 2d 350, 358-59 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997).
81. Id.
82. See id. at 359.
83. See id. at 358-59.
84. State v. Smith, 641 So. 2d 849, 851 (Fla. 1994) (quoting Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S.

517, 528 (1984)).
85. See Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266, 285 (1948).
86. See Calhoun v. Department of Health & Rehabilitative Servs., 500 So. 2d 674, 678
(Fla.3d DCA 1987).
87. See O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 351-52 (1987).
88. 509 So. 2d 1170 (Fla.3d DCA 1987).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol49/iss5/4

12

Keene: Chemical Castration: An Analysis of Florida's New "Cutting Edge"
FLORIDA'S CHEMICAL CASTRATION LAW

or implied consent." 9 This rule also was adopted by Florida's Fourth
District Court of Appeal in Singletary v. Costello," where the court
stated that "a prisoner retains the fundamental right to privacy espoused
by Article I, section 23 of the Florida Constitution. ... [and possesses]
a fundamental right to refuse non-consensual medical treatment even
though he [or she is] incarcerated." 9 Therefore, under Florida law,
prisoners do not lose their fundamental right to choose or refuse medical
treatment simply because they are incarcerated.92
In addition, in 1989, the Supreme Court of Florida affirmed an
opinion by the Second District Court of Appeal finding that the right to
refuse treatment was guaranteed by Article 1, section 23 of the Florida
Constitution.93 In affirming the appellate court's opinion, the Supreme
Court of Florida stated that "a competent person has the constitutional
right to choose or refuse medical treatment, and that right extends to all
relevant decisions concerning one's health."94 Furthermore, although
the court referred to a "competent person," the right to choose or refuse
medical treatment nevertheless is retained when an individual becomes
incompetent.95 That right merely must be exercised by a surrogate
decisionmaker. 96 In finding that the right to choose or refuse medical
treatment falls within Florida's right to privacy, the Supreme Court of
Florida established that decisions regarding one's own medical treatment
are legitimately private decisions entitled to freedom from governmental
intrusion.97
Because bodily integrity and the right to refuse medical treatment are
encompassed by Florida's right to privacy, the correct standard of
review to be applied to the Florida castration law is strict scrutiny.9" As
such, the state must prove it has a compelling interest in denying the
privacy right and that the interest is accomplished through the least
intrusive means. 99

89. Id. at 1172.
90. 665 So. 2d 1099 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996).

91. Id. at 1105.
92. See id.

93. See State v. Herbert (In re Guardianship of Browning), 568 So. 2d 4, 11 (Fla. 1989).
94. Id. (emphasis provided).
95. See id. at 12-13.
96. See id.
97. See id. at 13-14 (Although no right is absolute, the strictest level of scrutiny is
imposed requiring the state to show a compelling interest which is "narrowly tailored in the least
intrusive manner possible .....

98. See id.
99. See id.
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2. Compelling State Interest
Once a legitimate expectation of privacy is found, the privacy
interest is implicated and the burden of proof shifts to the government
to show that "the challenged regulation serves a compelling state
interest.""' ° The state must therefore demonstrate that it has a compelling interest in forcing all sex offenders to submit to intravenous
injections of MPA.' 1 The Supreme Court of Florida has recognized
four state interests that must be balanced against an individual's privacy
right to choose or refuse medical treatment." They include: (1) the
preservation of life, (2) the protection of innocent third parties, (3) the
prevention of suicide, and (4) the maintenance of the ethical integrity of
the medical profession."e An additional group of interests has been
recognized when the claimant is a prisoner: the "preservation of internal
order and discipline, the maintenance of institutional security, and the
rehabilitation of prisoners."" °
Preservation of life generally has been found to be the most
significant of the recognized state interests. Cases which address this
interest, however, deal with the right to die, and therefore are not
implicated by the Florida castration law. 6 The third interest, the
prevention of suicide, is not implicated for the same reason."° The
fourth interest, integrity of the medical profession, is considered the
least important state interest) °8
The state would likely argue that the protection of third parties is a
compelling state interest that overrides the privacy rights of sex
offenders. The state would likely argue that the prevention of violent
rapes, child molestation, and other heinous sex crimes is more important
than a guilty defendant's privacy interests. Although there is some doubt
as to whether the recidivism rates of sex offenders warrant the use of

100. Beagle v. Beagle, 678 So. 2d 1271, 1276 (Fla. 1996) (quoting Winfield, 477 So. 2d
at 547).
101. See id.
102. See Browning, 586 So. 2d at 14.
103. See id. The interests listed by the court were not meant to be bright-line tests of
whether the state has a compelling interest, but were intended to serve as guidelines in situations
where conflict often arises. See Public Health Trust of Dade County v. Wons, 541 So. 2d 96,

97 (Fla. 1989).
104. Costello, 665 So. 2d at 1105 (quoting Commissioner of Correction v. Myers, 399
N.E.2d 452, 457 (Mass. 1979)).
105. See id.
106. See, e.g., Browning, 568 So. 2d at 12-14 (discussing the individual's right to refuse
medical treatment where refusal will result in death).
107. See id.
108. See id.
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forced chemical castration,"° the state likely would argue that the
recidivism rates justify this relatively drastic measure. Even if the state
interest is shown to be compelling, however, the Florida castration law
must satisfy another more demanding prong of strict scrutiny analysis.
3. Least Intrusive Means
Even if the state can demonstrate a compelling state interest which
outweighs the privacy rights of sex offenders, the state must still show
that the measures taken are accomplished "through the use of the least
intrusive means.' ' . The Florida castration law arguably does not
achieve the government's interests through the least intrusive means.
Furthermore, the effectiveness of the means themselves is questionable.
a. MPA's Limited Effectiveness
Under the Florida castration law, all sex offenders are potential
candidates for forced injection with MPA."' However, studies indicating the effectiveness of MPA on sexual offenders show that the drug is
only effective on a certain class of offenders, namely paraphilias."'
Although the law provides that a court-appointed medical officer will
determine whether or not a defendant is an "appropriate candidate for
treatment,"". there is no guarantee that this determination can accurately be made."' Because the motivations for committing sex crimes
are widely varied," 5 and the diagnosis of the only class of sexual
deviance on which the drug is effective is very difficult to correctly
ascertain," 6 the Florida castration law allows the drug to be forcefully
injected into defendants who will not be affected in the manner in which
the state proposes.
In addition, research shows that the use of MPA is only effective
when used on willing participants." 7 The Florida castration law
provides no room for the consent of the defendant; the use of MPA is,
in many cases, mandatory."' Forcefully injecting a powerful, body-

109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

See supra text accompanying notes 46-47.
See Beagle, 678 So. 2d at 1276.
See supra text accompanying note 11.
See supra text accompanying notes 39-44.
See supra text accompanying note 17.
See supra text accompanying note 36 (describing the difficulties in diagnosing

paraphilia as compared to alternative motivations for sexual misconduct).
115.
116.
117.
118.

See supra text accompanying notes 34-35.
See supra text accompanying note 37.
See supra text accompanying note 39.
See 1997 Fla. Laws ch. 97-184(b) (requiring treatment with MPA where the defendant
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altering drug into an unwilling sex offender who may be motivated by
dangerous inclinations other than paraphilia is not only a violation of
bodily integrity,11 9 but a potentially dangerous policy. "[]t is difficult
to understand how rapists, who may already feel inadequate sexually,
can be aided by a process which may serve to enhance their sense of
inadequacy." 1" Although the drug will not be administered to defendants the court-appointed medical officer determines are inappropriate
candidates (which may or may not include those withholding consent),
the language of the Florida castration law leaves ample room for abuse
and ineffectiveness. 2 ' If legislators are truly concerned with recidivism
and rehabilitation, then the law must provide for the defendant's
consent.
Even if the law were to provide for such consent, it is questionable
whether a defendant can actually consent to such treatment." Facing
a decision between consenting to chemical castration or spending an
increased amount of time in jail" arguably amounts to coercion."
Even if "consent" were forthcoming, the sincerity of this "consent"
would be questionable. For MPA treatment to work, the defendant must
give consent, not in the sense that he chooses to be released and take a
drug, but in the sense that he is remorseful and legitimately desires to
aid his own rehabilitation.'2
Finally, MPA is effective only when used in conjunction with
psychological counseling. 26 The Florida castration law, however,
provides for no such counseling. 27 Nor does the law provide for
follow-up rehabilitative therapy or treatment of potential side effects."
Recidivism is therefore not likely to be curtailed, as the defendant

has a prior conviction).
119. See supra text accompanying notes 89-97.
120. Green, supra note 28, at 8 (quoting Asher R. Pacht, The Rapist in Treatment:
Professional Myths and Psychological Realities, in SEXUAL ASSAULT 90 (M. Walker & S.
Broadsky eds., 1976)).

121. See 1997 Fla. Laws ch. 97-184(2)(a).
122. See, e.g., Douglas J. Besharov & Andrew Vachhs, Sex Offenders: Is Castrationan
Acceptable Punishment?, A.B.A. J.,
July 1992, at 42-43.
123. This presumes that, if there were a consent component, the law would give the
defendant a choice between submitting to treatment or staying in prison. This is a logical
assumption, since it is unlikely that a defendant would consent to treatment if the alternative
were no treatment and release from prison.
124. See Kimberly A. Peters, Comment, Chemical Castration: An Alternative to
Incarceration,31 DUQ. L. REV. 307, 316 (1993).
125. See supra text accompanying notes 39-44.
126. See id.
127. See 1997 Fla. Laws ch. 97-184.
128. See id.
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probably will be "set free" without the necessary components of
physical and psychological treatment.'29 Because counseling is so vital
to the success of MPA treatment,"3° the lack of a provision providing
for such counseling in the Florida castration law renders the legislation
ineffective in achieving the "compelling" state interest of protecting the
public from repeat sex offenders.
b. Intrusive Physical Effects
The Florida castration law not only provides for ineffective administration, but also provides for measures which are unnecessarily
physically intrusive. The law is presumably gender neutral,"' and
although women compose only a small percentage of sex offenders, the
law allows for the mandatory treatment of women with MPA.
Arguably, the medical determination required by the law would prevent
MPA from being administered to a female who would be affected by the
drug in ways unrelated to the state interest in reducing recidivism and
protecting third parties. The reliance on a chance determination by a
court-appointed medical officer, however, is not the least intrusive
method of achieving those interests.
Compared to incarceration, chemical castration arguably is much
more physically intrusive to a defendant. Although the status of
"prisoner" allows the state to deny many basic rights to an individual,' that deprivation is more often temporary. MPA, on the other
hand, has been shown to have a multitude of side effects, some of which
are unique to male defendants." Although some of these side effects
may dissipate when treatment is ceased, there is no provision for
cessation of MPA treatment in the Florida castration law. 3 In fact,
many experts believe that there are permanent effects associated with
long-term use of MPA 36 When weighed against temporary incarceration, the permanence of MPA treatment may be far more intrusive.

129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.

See supra text accompanying note 39.
See id.
See supra note 6 and text accompanying note 13.
See 1997 Fla. Laws ch. 97-184.
See supra text accompanying notes 85-86.
See supra text accompanying notes 23 & 26.
See 1997 Fla. Laws ch. 97-184(2)(a).
See supra text accompanying notes 26-28.
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VI. CONCLUSION

MPA is a powerful drug.'37 Given the Florida castration law's
reference to the administration of MPA as a "sentence"'3 and that
law's inclusion in the penal code,13 9 chemical castration is analogous
to lethal injection used in many states to perform the ultimate punishment: death. Non-consensual lethal injection is normally accompanied
by strict procedural safeguards."' The procedural safeguard in the
Florida castration law, however, is the advice of a court-appointed
medical officer.14' This not only raises due process concerns regarding
who should make the decision when and to whom to administer the
drug,142 but also concerning the lack of any explicit procedural standards for determining appropriateness of candidacy for MPA treatment.
In any event, Florida's new law mandating the chemical castration
of repeat sexual offenders is unconstitutional under the Article I, section
23 of the Florida Constitution. Although the state may have a compelling interest in reducing the recidivism of sex offenders and protecting
innocent third parties, the Florida castration law does not achieve this
interest through the least intrusive means. As written, the Florida
castration law does not provide for the effective administration of MPA
as a deterrent to sexual battery. No recognition of the multitude of
motivations underlying the crime of sexual battery is given, and without
such recognition, MPA will be misused and abused. A consent clause
in the law might facilitate the effectiveness of MPA treatment on sex
offenders. Furthermore, a provision for post-treatment psychological
counseling would improve the chances of MPA achieving the intended
goals. Without these provisions, however, the Florida castration law
cannot reduce recidivism in the least intrusive manner. The law
therefore must be amended or rewritten not only to remove constitutional barriers, but also to establish its effectiveness as a deterrent to sex
crimes.

137. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 13-13-71(b)(548) (1996) (classifying MPA as a
"dangerous drug").
138. See 1997 Fla. Laws ch. 97-184.
139. See id.
140. Although Florida uses electrocution rather than lethal injection, the intended result is

the same. In Florida, the strict procedural safeguards include "a separate sentencing proceeding.., by the trial judge before the trial jury ...or ...a jury impaneled for that purpose....
In the proceeding, evidence may be presented as to any matter... ." See FLA. STAT. §
921.141(1) (1997).
141. See 1998 Fla. Laws ch. 97-184(2)(a).
142. See generally Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 228-36 (1990) (discussing due
process concerns in the context of a medical "hearing committee" used to make the decision to
administer antipsychotic drugs to a mental patient).
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